Russia Deploys 600 kmph Drones in Waves, Signalling a New Era of Warfare

Russia’s Geran-5 Drone Strategy Puts New Pressure on Ukrainian Air Defences

Russia’s latest jet-powered Geran drones are creating a fresh challenge for Ukraine’s air-defence network, combining high speed, long range and large-scale deployment to make interception increasingly difficult.

The Geran-5 is reported to reach speeds of around 600 kilometres per hour and operate at altitudes of up to 6,000 metres. Its performance has blurred the traditional distinction between one-way attack drones and cruise missiles.

Maksym Zhorin, deputy commander of Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps, recently acknowledged the difficulty of countering the new drones, saying Ukrainian forces do not yet know how to deal with them effectively.

From Shahed Drones to Jet-Powered Gerans

Russia began using Iranian-designed Shahed-type drones extensively in 2022. Ukraine initially responded by deploying mobile anti-drone teams equipped with machine guns, gun trucks and short-range interceptor systems.

Those measures proved highly effective against slower, propeller-driven drones. Ukraine at one stage reportedly achieved interception rates of more than 90 per cent.

Russia subsequently adapted its tactics. The newer Geran variants use compact jet engines instead of the piston engines and propellers found on earlier Shahed-type systems.

According to Kateryna Bondar, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, the Geran-3, Geran-4 and Geran-5 variants offer progressively higher speeds, with the Geran-5 capable of reaching roughly 600 kmph and operating at altitudes of up to 5,000-6,000 metres.

Their speed and altitude make them difficult targets for the machine guns and relatively inexpensive interceptor drones that Ukraine previously relied upon.

Speed Creates a New Defence Problem

Bondar said Ukrainian counter-drone systems were largely designed around slower propeller-driven targets. The faster Gerans leave defenders with far less time to detect, identify and engage them.

She said Ukrainian interceptors typically reach around 250-300 kmph, making it difficult for them to chase targets travelling at considerably higher speeds.

Some newer Geran variants are also reported to feature electronic-warfare capabilities designed to interfere with interceptor systems during the final stage of an engagement.

Yuriy Cherevashenko, deputy commander of Ukraine’s air force, highlighted another feature of the drones: their flight path and altitude can be changed remotely by an operator.

That ability makes their trajectory less predictable and complicates efforts to establish an interception solution.

Russia’s Numbers Add to the Challenge

Technology is only part of Russia’s strategy. Moscow is also deploying the drones in increasingly large waves.

Russia reportedly launched around 450 jet-powered drones in June, with the number rising to about 2,850 in August. In some attacks, jet-powered variants accounted for roughly 70 per cent of the drones deployed.

Bondar said the scale of the attacks is central to Russia’s approach. Even a high interception rate can leave significant numbers of drones reaching their targets when hundreds are launched simultaneously.

Large-scale attacks also allow Russia to combine drones with decoys, different flight paths, varying altitudes and multiple directions of attack. The objective is to stretch Ukrainian radar and air-defence resources and force the use of costly interceptors.

The strategy therefore places pressure not only on Ukraine’s air-defence equipment but also on its missile stocks, personnel and ability to maintain a continuous defensive posture.

Why Geran-5 Matters

James Patton Rogers, a drone specialist and lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, said replacing the original Shahed’s piston engine with a jet engine has produced a faster weapon that remains significantly cheaper than many conventional cruise missiles.

The combination allows Russia to conduct sustained long-range attacks without using expensive missiles for every target. Missiles can instead be reserved for heavily defended or strategically important targets.

Bondar described the Geran-5 as effectively a low-cost, mass-produced deep-strike weapon, arguing that its importance lies in the economics of modern warfare.

Instead of relying exclusively on expensive missiles, Russia can use large numbers of comparatively cheaper drones to place sustained pressure on air defences.

Ukraine Searches for a New Counter

Ukraine has been looking for a cost-effective answer to the jet-powered drones. Ukrainian forces identified wreckage of such systems earlier this year, and the country’s military intelligence agency subsequently released information about their deployment.

In July, Ukraine invited manufacturers to test a new generation of interceptor drones. However, some systems reportedly struggled at high speeds, with several crashing during testing.

Ukrainian forces are now examining multiple approaches, including faster interceptor drones, inexpensive guided missiles, electronic warfare and methods of disrupting the navigation systems of incoming drones.

One proposed tactic is for interceptor drones to make head-on attacks rather than attempting to chase faster targets from behind.

Bondar said Ukraine will likely need a layered defence combining high-speed interceptors, stronger detection networks, electronic warfare and attacks against the supply chains and production facilities supporting Russia’s drone programme.

She also argued that Ukraine and its Western partners would need to produce large quantities of relatively inexpensive high-speed interceptors rather than relying only on a small number of sophisticated systems.

A Wider Lesson for Air Defence

The evolution of the Geran family is being closely watched beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict because it demonstrates how mass-produced drones can alter the economics of air defence.

Rogers said future militaries will need affordable methods of countering large drone formations while also addressing the supply chains and industrial infrastructure that support them.

The challenge is not simply to develop a better interceptor. Defenders must also ensure that the cost of destroying incoming drones does not vastly exceed the cost of launching them.

Bondar said ballistic and cruise missiles are unlikely to disappear because they retain advantages against hardened, heavily defended and time-sensitive targets.

Instead, drones and missiles may increasingly perform different roles. Large numbers of drones can be used to overwhelm or exhaust air defences, while more expensive missiles are reserved for targets where their precision and destructive capability are considered necessary.

The growing use of high-speed, mass-produced drones therefore points to a broader shift in modern warfare: air defence is becoming as much an industrial and economic challenge as a technological one.